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regimes in the Middle East which often oppressed their people in
the name of Islamic legitimacy.
Keywords: iran, the Islamic revolution, politics, international
relations
ABSTRAK
Hubungan antara Islam dan Barat merupakan masalah penting di
dunia internasioanl dewasa ini. Islam dan negara-negara Muslim
merupakan bagian dari factor-faktor yang mempengaruhi dinamika
politik di dunia. Terkait hal ini, Revolusi islam di Iran pada tahun
1979 adalah satu dari isu-isu utama yang memberikan kontribusi
terhadap pembentukan hubungan antara islam dan Barat, bahkan
hingga saat ini. Hal ini karena revolusi tersebut menginspirasi
munculnya gerakan-gerakan islam di seluruh dunia dan memicu
gerakan sentiment anti Amerika di kalangan Muslim. Revolusi
tersebut juga membentuk persepsi tentang ancaman dari
fundamentalisme Islam di dunia Barat. Artikel ini menganalisa
latarbelakang dan konteks Revolusi Islam di Iran dan dampaknya
bagi Amerika, Rusia dan Negara-negara Arab. Tulisan ini menegaskan
bahwa Revolusi Iran merupakan ancaman bagi seluruh banyak
negara karena Iran telah menempatkan revolusi tersebut sebagai
aset yang dapat diekspor ke negara-negara lain. Revolusi ini
setidaknya menantang kepentingan-kepentingan negara-negara
Barat di Timur Tengah yang terkait dengan supply minyak dan gas
bumi. Revolusi Iran juga mengancam rejim-rejim otoritarian di Timur
Tengah yang menindas melakukan penindasan terhadap masyarakat
dengan dalih Islam.
Kata Kunci: Iran, revolusi Islam, politik, hubungan
internasional.
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ABSTRACT
The relationships between Islam and the
West have become an important issue in
the international world until today. Islam
and Muslim countries are part of the
factors which influenced the political
dynamics in the world. In this regard, the
Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979 is one
of the major issues that contributed to the
shaping the relationship between Islam
and the West, even until to date. This is
because this revolution has inspired the
emergence Islamic movements around
the world and triggered anti American
sentiment among Muslims. This revolution
also shaped the perception about the
threat from Islamic fundamentalism in the
West. This article will analyze the back-
ground and the context of the Islamic
Revolution in Iran and its impacts on the
United States, the Soviet Union, and the
Arab states. It will argue that the Islamic
Revolution become the major threat for
all the countries because Iran has placed
its revolution as the asset that would be
exported to other countries. This revolu-
tion has challenged Western interests in
the Middle East particularly on oil and
natural gas supplies. The Islamic revolu-
tion also threatened the authoritarian
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INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, conflict and cooperation
between Islam and the West have become an
important issue which has been considered as
a significant factor in political policy making
for many countries in the world. Islam and
Muslim countries are part of the factors that
rose and provided many contributions to the
world politics, positively and negatively. The
increasing number of the Muslim adherents
in many countries and the rise of Muslim
fundamentalists, are examples why Islam and
Muslim countries have been considered as an
interesting political and social issue. In this
context, there are three major issues which
have contributed to the relationship between
Islam and the West. Those issues have made
the situations in which creating conflict
between them, influencing their perceptions,
and encouraging the West to think about
their foreign policy to Muslim worlds.1 The
first great issue is the Islamic Revolution in
Iran in 1979 which overthrew Reza Shah and
replaced it with Islamic Republic of Iran. This
revolution triggered anti American sentiment
around the Muslim world and shaped the
US’s perception about fundamentalist Islam.
The second is the Palestinian problem which
was seen by Islamic people and Muslim
countries as the vivid picture of the US
government which was driven by Jewish
lobby. As a result, UN and the US were seen
as unable to push Israel and to promote peace
resolution in this area. The third is the
Afghanistan conflict that was often seen by
Muslim as the contradictory the US approach
to solve the problem and this greatly contrib-
uted to the 9/11 terrorist attack.
This article will examine the background
and the context of Islamic Revolution in Iran
as well as its impacts on the United States and
its allies, the Soviet Union and all the Arab
states. As many observers and researcher said,
Islamic Revolution in Iran was the major
threat for the existence many foreign coun-
tries such as the US and Soviet Union, also
for countries in the Middle East. Specifically,
the following questions will guide trajectory
of this essay: What is the historical and social
background that triggered to Iranian Revolu-
tion? Why did the United States and its allies,
the Soviet Union and all the Arab states
consider the Islamic Revolution in Iran a
major threat? Did they see it as a threat for
similar reasons? In attempt to answer these
questions, this article is divided into four
sections. The first section examines the
historical and social background which
contributed to the sharp Islamic Revolution
in Iran. The second section discusses the
relationship between the US and Iran in the
era before and after the revolution. The
Third section assesses the position of Soviet
Union in Iran and the impact of the revolu-
tion for its foreign policy. The fourth section
elaborates the impact and the threat of
Islamic Revolution in Iran for Arab states
and their responses about the revolution.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE
ISLAMIC REVOLUTION IN IRAN
The background of the Islamic Revolution
in Iran can be tracked from the long histori-
cal root which has happened since nine-
teenth and twentieth centuries. This is
because the historical event has close correla-
tion with the Iranian history at that time. At
the past, the Iranian history related to politi-
cal traditions, economic and social develop-
ment at many states that had been influ-
enced by Western capitalism and imperialism.
In fact, the expansion of European capitalism
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and civilization gave two impacts for the
Iranian social structure. On the one hand, it
created the convergence between European
capitalism and the Iranian social structure.
The convergence can be seen during the rule
of the Qajar Empire (1786-1921) where many
developments in Iranian society had been
made. For example, there were many reforms
and modernization in the military, bureau-
cracy, tax system, the emergence of modern
intelligentsia, and others.
On the other hand, the expansion of
Western countries also resulted in a gradual
divergence for Iranian people, especially at
the cultural level. This is because the Euro-
pean expansion resulted not only on eco-
nomic reform, but also on triggering cultural
and religious reactions. The proof for this is
that many of the traditional and urban
economic sectors of the bazaar (social groups
in Iran) felt threatened by Western imperial-
ism. On the same time, the ulama (religious
leaders) also felt threatened by the rising of
Western influence which can reduce their
social position in the society.2 From the above
conditions, we can see that people in Iran do
not stand in the one position when faced
with Western imperialism. Some people and
groups sought benefits from the Western
impact, while others felt threatened with the
influence of Western values and power in
their society.
The Western intervention to Iranian
society obviously became much greater and
could not be controlled when Muhammad
Reza Shah came to power after the forced
abdication of his father Reza Shah in 1941 by
the Allied forces, Russia (Soviet Union) and
Britain. The main reason for this overthrow
is that Reza Shah made close relationship
with Germany. At that time, Germany was
the enemy of Russia and Britain in World
War II. After the power replacement in Iran,
the government gave more positive hopes to
the society as the change of power orienta-
tion from the authoritarian regime to be-
come more democratic.
However, this democratic regime and free
condition were often confusing because
Iranian society has many institutions, which
they have to follow. For example, the legiti-
mating competition between religious leaders
and secular leaders in Iranian society often
triggered conflict between groups in society.
Although the occupation of Iran by Russia
and Britain and the change in regime sug-
gested political freedom, this condition also
created social and economic crisis. This is
because War World II gave contribution for
the crisis in this country. On the other sides,
this crisis suggested the intensification of
political activity and political crisis during
1941-1953.3 During this period, the peak
conflict between nationalist groups and other
classes was featured in Iran.
As part of the strategies to end the crisis
and to make greater intervention, in 1953
the United States (US) had supported and
backed the military coup against the national-
ist government of Mohammed Mosaddeq
and suppressed the oppositional social forces.
It can be noted that this was the first large
scale the US intervention in any at the
Middle East countries. By supporting the
military coup, the US got many advantages,
for instance Iran’s position became an anti-
communist frontline state and close ally to
the US. For the US interests, it is also impor-
tant to stop the Soviet expansion in the
Middle East and to end British monopoly
over Iranian oil.4 Unfortunately, the authori-
tarian state which was established and led by
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Mohammad Reza Shah after the coup with
economic and financial support from the US,
did not finish the crisis. Then, the reformula-
tion of the Shi’i political doctrine as revolu-
tionary doctrine becomes a gradual process
and starting after the coup and reaching its
height in the 1960s and 1970s.5
Theda Scokpol, the expert of social revolu-
tion, states that under the second Shah, Iran
became dependent more to oil and natural
gas. Iran also transformed to a ‘rentier state’
which has close relationship and linked their
policies to the world capitalist economy.
Besides that, like the rulers of the Old Re-
gimes in France, Russia, and China, the Shah
of Iran was an “absolute monarch” and his
power is more powerful than the old Shah.
He introduced the modernized military
power and also operated the secret police
force.6 In addition, the other factor which
also contributed to the emergence of Iranian
Revolution was the Shah’s policy to become
the “agent” US which has close association
with them. As a consequence, the American
military and economic presence largely at
Iran, and this situation acted as a major
stimulus to mass mobilization. If we compare
to others revolution such as in the English,
China, the Russian, and the Cuban, the anti
foreign aspiration in challenging the legiti-
macy of the social structure also was a major
factor of the protest movements.7
Furthermore, one of the most controver-
sial policies issued by Shah Iran was a “White
Revolution” in 1960s. By this program, the
regime created a land reform program,
redistributed land to wealthier peasants,
extended state control to villages, and re-
duced the power of the bazaari’s institution.
Nevertheless, this revolution had poor
planning, many poor peasants left much the
agrarian and move to the urban area. As a
result, urban Iran grew to become almost 50
% of the population and many of them live
in a heavy condition.8 In fact, many different
social forces reacted to the doctrine of the
White Revolution, especially from the land-
lord class, the religious leader, the bazaar and
also from the secular oppositional parties.
They considered that the revolution is a big
threat for their existence in society. For
example, the ulama’ saw this program as the
modernization power which can reduce their
authorities, the bazaar looked this revolution
as sign of intervention from government into
their commercial and threatening their
autonomy, and the landlords constituted it as
a threat for their landlordism. Then, they
organized in the National Front and criticized
the Shah’s program seriously. After that, the
discontent of the religious community to-
gether with the economical and political crisis
led to a revolt in June 1963 which declared by
Ayatullah Ruhullah Khomeini. Unfortu-
nately, the state dealt the movement with
military means who brutally suppressed the
protestors. After that, the leader of National
Front also was arrested and Khomeini was
banished to Turkey and later to Iraq.9
It is important to note that arresting of
the leader of National Front triggered the
mass protesters who demonstrated the Shah
policies and his alliance with the US. To deal
with this problem, Shah operated the SAVAK
(his CIA and Israeli-trained security agency) to
arrest and to suppress all the people or the
organization which against his power. As a
consequence, Iranian state came under the
revolutionary pressure in 1977-1978 and all of
the oppositional institutions made an alliance
to overthrow the Shah’s regime. Because the
absolute monarchy model which was used as
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his government style, Shah has to make and
issue all the decision. According to Theda
Scokpol, this situation became a major factor
for the success of the Shah’s opponent to
overthrow him. The main reason for this is
that his proponent felt difficult to consolidate
their support without Shah’s instruction.10
Finally, the Islamic Revolution in Iran got
their victory and Shah Iran left Iran in
January 1979.
THE UNITED STATES AND IRAN: FROM
THE CLOSE FRIEND TO BE THE GREAT
ENEMY
It can be argued that the relationship
between US and Iran had changed dramati-
cally after the Islamic Revolution in 1979.
Before the historical change which has
transformed Iran from monarchy absolute
regime under Shah Iran to Islamic Republic,
the US was the main sponsor and closest
friend of Iran in the Middle East. This close
relationship has begun in 1953 when the US
supported military regimes and brutal dicta-
tor who overthrew the democratic nationalist
government of Dr. Mohammad Mosaddeq.
Although the US often claimed itself as a
guardian of freedom and democracy, its
foreign political policies often favoured
suppressive and authoritative regimes. The
US’s involvement in Iran by giving fully
supports in engineering the military coup was
one of clear examples about American’s
double standards. Indeed, the CIA was
directly involved and installed Mohammad
Reza Shah’s in Iran in 1954.11 After that, the
US government usually have stood behind
self-appointed leader, providing them finan-
cial and military supports, and also gave
security as well as political advice to the
regime.
On the contrary, the political and eco-
nomical intervention of the US to Iran by
using the second Shah’s regime policies did
not get support from the Iranian people.
Certainly, many of the bazaari and the ulama
in Iran society felt that the policies of Shah
Iran obviously became a big threat of their
position in society. Besides that, Shah Iran
abuse of civil liberties of Iranian people and
his extensive use of state military approach to
oppress critics and opposition, also added the
negative perception of Iranian people about
the US existence. In this era, the United
States became identified with an illegitimate
and repressive government. Then, this
condition triggered Iranian resentment to
Shah’s regime and American intervention.12
As Sheikhneshin argues, it is clear that since
the Islamic Revolution of 1979, antagonism
and mutual suspicion have characterized the
relations between the US and Iran.13 Indeed,
this condition continues for almost three
decades until now where the US has regarded
Iran as the main sponsor of international
terrorism and vice versa.
Although the Shah’s Iran regime was
destroyed by popular demonstrations which
led by religious leaders under the guidance of
Ayatollah Ruhullah Khomeini 1979, the
demonstrations continues in many areas. The
demonstrations now directed against “the US
imperialism” as a powerful symbol for Iranian
mindset of the American interventions in
the past, also against all domestic political
forces which was led by non-Islamic elites.14
Interestingly, Theda Scocpol argues that an
extraordinary series of mass demonstrations
were the result of cooperation of all opposi-
tional power in Iran against Shah’s regime.
At this event, although they face the lethal of
military oppression, the unemployed, worker,
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artisans, merchants, students, and middle
class struggled together for fighting the
Shah’s regime. They mobilized all the inclu-
sive movement against a “corrupt”, “imperial-
ist”, and monarchy power which was fully
backed by the US power.15
It is clear that one of the factors increasing
negative perception of Iranian people for the
US intervention was the encouragement the
United States which facilitated the Shah to
leave Iran in January 1979. It is also added by
the admission of the Shah to the United
States on October 22, 1979 for medical
treatment. Many of the proponents of
Iranian Revolution believed that by helping
Shah, the United States actually do not
consider the Iranian people needs and their
legitimate aspirations which were reflected by
popular movements. The United States only
want to save its interests and to continue
their political interventions by giving political
support for Iranian elite who opposed the
Islamic Revolution agendas.
The above point of view also expressed by
Sheikhneshin who wrote that after the
Islamic Revolution in Iran (1979), the US
policy makers wanted to maintain relations
with Iran because of their economic, political
and military interests. In contrast, Iranian
elites and people denied it and changed to
increase anti-Americanism. But, the moder-
ates groups in Iran which do not fully agree
with Khomeini’s administration for whom
the US has a hope to maintain their relation-
ship after the Revolution, do not satisfy with
the US policy toward Iran. They think the
US policy seem like a game of “wait and
see”16. Indeed, members of Iran’s religious
circles also interpreted that that the desire to
maintain cooperative relations between the
US and Iran as the strategy of the US imperi-
alism and international Zionism to occupy
Iran again.17 As a result, after the Reza Shah’s
fall, the US relations with Iran never normal-
ized.
Moreover, the most important fact causing
the United States thought that the Islamic
Revolution in Iran became the major threat
for his states and its allies was the hostage
crisis on November 4, 1979. At that time,
Iranian people who opposed to the US
presence in Iran took over the US embassy
and held its diplomats and employees hostage
for 444 days. This action not only destroyed
the consolidation to refine the relationship of
both countries, but also insulted American
national pride. As a consequence, the action
also has influenced every the US approach
toward Iran.18 After that, the US saw that
Iran can threat not only the existence of the
United States in Iran, but also the interests of
the US in Middle East countries. Thus, if the
US do not take the initiative actions to stop
the Iranian influences to its neighbours in
Middle East, Iran will become a great power
in Middle East areas which will directly
become a major threat for Israeli interest. In
fact, the rising of Iran power reminded the
US about the Pan-Arabism which was initi-
ated by Gammal Abdul Nasser during 1960-
an era.
Meanwhile, Ayatullah Ruhullah Khomeini
as the highest leader of Iranian state, consoli-
dated Iranian power to prevent all of the
enemy from both internal and external
power. At that position, the United States
became the great enemy of Iranian existence
in the world and they called the US as the
“Great Satan”. As the “Great Satan”, the US
had been associated with external forces of
corruption.19 Indeed, the special status as the
“Great Satan” for the US was derived from
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three basic reasons: the US connection with
Shah, Khomeini’s view about the US as the
greatest enemy of Islam, and the US relations
with Israel.20 Consequently, it was not sur-
prised that the US then gave a strong support
and provided satellite photographs to Iraq
during Iraq-Iran war starting in September
1980. Actually, it is clear that Saddam
Hussein and many of his Arab counterparts
and were protected by the USA, had felt
challenged by Islamic revolution.21
Sheikhneshin points out that the US
policies towards Iran during the Iran-Iraq war
raised the level of antagonism between two
countries. The main reason for this is that
Iranian people saw that the US as potential
threat which can repeat its occupation to Iran
and destroy their Islamic Revolution.22 This
reason was supported by the fact that during
the Iran and Iraq war, the US used its influ-
ence to pressure its allies to stop arms support
to Iran and to dishearten them from purchas-
ing Iranian oil. In contrast, the US encour-
aged its allies to support and give financial
contribution for Iraq23 Consequently, at the
first time of Iran-Iraq war, Iraq become more
powerful than Iran and it has a big confi-
dence to win the war. Unfortunately, as some
observer noted, Iran gain the victory of the
war due to the spirit of Iranian Revolution
which gave more spirit and energy for
Iranian’s arms and people.
THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION AND ITS
THREAT FOR SOVIET UNION
It is clear that the Islamic Revolution in
Iran does not only trigger the internal dy-
namics in Iranian society, but also give major
effect to political phenomenon in interna-
tional world. The Iranian revolution was one
of the last disruption within a bipolar system
which the Western system and the Soviet
system competed each other. Both of them
try to find allies and to widen its influences in
many countries in the world. As a strategic
country which placed on the closed area with
the former Soviet Union, the position of Iran
is very important to the Americans. Conse-
quently, the USA did everything to prevent
Iran to become a Soviet satellite during the
Cold War and after. So, it is not a surprise
why the mass demonstrations who oppose the
Pahlavi regime were ignored by the US. The
US powers continued to support the Shah
regime due to its Iranian’s regime loyalty to
the US.24 Unfortunately, although the Shah
was fully backed by the US power, the mass
demonstrations succeeded to overthrow him
on the 1979.
It has been asserted that the US leadership
actually try to establish new relationships with
Iran after Iranian Revolution. However, this
political endeavour was failure because
Iranian’s new regime was unwilling to make
cooperation with the US. Then, the new
government in Iran compelled to make
policies and practices hostile to the US. As a
result, Iran declared its position as a neutral
and independent state which do not favour
neither to the US or Soviet Union. Instead of
that, Iran tried to build relationships with the
all countries based on reciprocal respect. As
Hafizullah Emadi states, this was manifested
in Iran’s popular slogan ‘Neither the West
nor the East- but Islam’. Indeed, Iran in the
post-Khomeini period remains to declared
policies of Islamic revolution. Iran also
strengthened its relations with the Third
World and the former Soviet Union, and
began to reemphasize its political role in the
Middle East.25
Actually, this new policy gave new hope
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for Soviet Union to reassert its relationship
with Iran after was closed by the US interven-
tion in Iran from 1953 to 1979. However, the
Iranian leadership was sceptical to Soviet
Union interests in the Middle East and does
not have intention to give its political orienta-
tion to Moscow instead of Washington. This
is because one the goal of the Islamic Revolu-
tion was to end Iran’s dependence on the
super power states and to build an indepen-
dent foreign policy.26 As a consequence, the
emergence of Islamic revolution caused
political earthquake among conservative
monarchs in the Middle East and secular
dictators who were backed by the US and
Soviet Union. Many of these countries had
felt endangered with the spread of Islamic
universalism and anti US-Soviet Union which
was contained by Islamic Revolution in Iran.
Furthermore, it should be mentioned that
during the World War II, Iran was occupied
by Britain and Soviet Union, and was re-
placed by the US in 1953 when the US
backed the military coup to overthrow
Mossadeq’s government. In this respect, we
can understand that the relationship between
Iran and Soviet Union actually was not at
equal position. In contrast, it can be said that
the relationship between Iran and Soviet
Union was not much different like Iran and
the US relations. In addition, while the
Soviet Union celebrated the overthrow of the
Shah as American puppet in Iran, it has not
been able to capitalize and occupy on Iran
again. Indeed, Soviet Union saw that the
power of the Islamic Revolution in Iran
would have inhibited the Russian invasion of
Afghanistan, or even prevented it. The
Soviet Union also was not secure with Iran’s
doctrine about Islamic universalism because
of its potential impact for Muslim adherents
living in Soviet area. If the doctrine spreads
and influences the Soviet people, perhaps
they can oppose the Kremlin government
which govern with absolute monarch styles
too.27 Furthermore, the facts prove that the
Soviet intervention of Afghanistan affect
unfavourably for the relations between the
Soviet Union and Iran. This is because Iran
supports the Muslim revolt against the Soviet
and named Soviet Union as an “oppressive
power”. Iran also called the Soviet Union to
withdraw their forces, return Afghan refuges,
and give the Muslim people to determine
their future. Then, Iran’s government also do
not prevent for protesters who held huge
demonstrations at Soviet embassy as protest
for the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.28
In that position, we can understand why
Soviet Union seems worrying to control Iran
after the Revolution moment. Although its
intervention to Iran will gave the Soviet
Union opportunity to access Iran’ oil and gas
supplies, the Soviet Union considered that
the desire to occupy the new Iranian regime
will give them a greater risks.
Regarding the above explanations, there
was not surprise why when the war occurred
between Iran and Iraq in September 1980, the
Western states and the Soviet Union gave Iraq
political and military supports. The Soviet
Union and Western countries have big hope
to Iraq for keeping the world from the impact
of the Islamic Revolution in Iran. This action
was also followed by the Gulf States which also
felt threatened with the export of Iranian
Revolution.29 For them, Iranian attempts to
export the Islamic revolution will destabilize
the Gulf region and contradict with the
interests of the Western Powers. This is be-
cause the Western powers would like to pre-
serve their status quo there.30
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Generally speaking, the Soviet policy
regarding Iran is greatly influenced by the
development of the power of the mullahs
(religious leaders). When the mullahs seem
strong, the Soviet increases its effort. In
contrast, when it shows weakness, the Soviet
Union would change their effort. Unfortu-
nately, the Iran’s winning in the Gulf war
with Iraq and its supporters have made its
regime more popular. As a result, the Iranian
internal political competition was won by the
Right, and the Left which was represented by
the Tudeh Party, Bani Sadr, dan the
Mojahedin-e-Khalq lost their power to partici-
pate in Iranian government. Then, the
banning of the Tudeh Party on 4 May 1983
became a sign of stopping the relations
between Iran and Soviet Union. This political
decision was made as a reaction to the
Soviet’s support for Iraq and Soviet interven-
tion in Afghanistan. Borrowing Aryeh Y.
Yodfat’s words, it was the Iran’s way to ‘pun-
ish the Soviet Union and a ‘declaration of
independence’ from the USSR.For Iranian
people, the Soviet Union was “no less satanic
than the United States”31 It can be argued
that it was the same declaration which was
given before to the United States regarding
the same political factors and consideration.
THE EXPORT OF REVOLUTION AS THE
REAL THREAT OF THE MIDDLE EAST
STATES
It has been argued that Iran’s foreign
policy after post-revolutionary under
Khomeini ruler as the Supreme Leader, in
general can be divided into two great aims.
Firstly, Iran tries to implement the doctrine
from Khomeini about “Neither East no West
but the Islamic Republic”. This ideological
doctrine clearly stated that Iran has to fight
against Western intervention. Secondly, Iran
also has a great goal to “export of the Revolu-
tion”. It means Iran would like to give fully
support for Muslim countries and non-
Muslim countries to liberate them from their
“oppressive and corrupts rulers”.32 Interest-
ingly, the ideological doctrine from Iranian
Revolution was followed by positive responses
from Muslim countries and the Third World
because they have lived under the authoritar-
ian regime and Western intervention for a
long time. As a consequence, many of the
middle and low class people at Muslim coun-
tries have a dream to follow the success of
Iranian Revolution.
Moreover, the dream for copying Iranian
Revolution in Muslim countries clearly
corresponds with the political policy of the
new Iranian regime. The new rulers in Iran
saw that their revolution would trigger
another revolution in the Middle East areas.
As a result, Iran seeks its neighbour countries
which also would like to employ the revolu-
tion. Iran gave these countries the enough
support by providing rhetoric, financial
support, and action. The main reason for this
is that for the new Iranian leadership, Islam
was a means by which the religion liberates
the world’s exploited people to fight against
the great power. It is also supported by the
thought of Imam Khomeini which argued
that export of the revolution was more
important than political stability and eco-
nomic development in Iran.33
 Meanwhile, the relationships between
Iran and Arab actually have made since the
seventh century when the Arab’s conquered
Iran. After the Islamization, Iran became part
of the Muslim communities, although Iran
has different language, culture, and political
orientation. The differences influenced to
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the relations between them, because the
Arab viewed that their race was superior to
other. These racial feelings also contributed
to them for discriminating non-Arab convert.
Some expert such as Shireen T. Hunter has
argued that ethnic and sectarian antagonism
are not major factor on the relationships
between Iran and the Arab, but these issues
became the divisive impact of other factors.
And this antagonism was used by Arab and
Iranian leaderships for gaining support from
their own people. For instance, many of
conservative states have argued that the
Iranian Revolution does not have relevance
for Arab states. This is because Iran’s people
were dominated by Shi’i follower, and the
Arabs consist from Sunni.34 For them, it was
very different with the phenomenon of Pan
Arabism who led by Gammal Abdul Naseer
and revolutionary ideology in Libya who was
led by Muammar Qadhafi.
However, the study which was conducted
by James A. Bill showed that the differences
between Arabs and Iranians in term of their
school of thought (Sunnis and Shi’ites), does
not necessary lead to the conclusion that
Iranian revolution cannot inspire revolution-
ary movements in Arab states. During his
fact-finding trips to Egypt, Saudi Arabia,
Bahrain, Oman, and the United Arab
Emirates on 1981, Bill showed that people
around the regions have viewed events in
Iran and the revolution with deep interest
and appeal feeling. For people in these Arab
countries, the revolution in Iran has inspired
them for three basic reasons: firstly, the
revolution became a successful example about
the masses could overthrow a corrupt and
repressive regime. Secondly, it was a successful
movement for national independence from
the superpower’s interventions. Thirdly, the
Iranian revolution was a vivid picture of “a
victory for Islam” which many Muslim adher-
ents has dreamed it for a long time.35
Although the Arabs populations felt
interested in the Islamic Revolution in Iran,
the governments and ruling elites of Arab
states have not been interested in the revolu-
tion. They view that the revolution as ex-
tremely dangerous and could challenge their
power and authority.36 They also thought
that the export and the proliferation of the
Iranian Revolution must be stopped by
consolidating the states in Middle East. As
was said by James A. Bill, the governments in
Arab states have often responded this revolu-
tion inconsistently, wildly, and ineffectively.
For example, President Husni Mubarok of
Egypt told that he did not consider Iranian
Shi’ite even to be Muslims. Many of Saudi
circles also said the same view.37
Interestingly, the Gulf Arabs’ attitude
toward the new government in Iran origi-
nally was a mixture of apprehension and
expectation. At the first time, they felt
optimistic with the statement of Mehdi
Bazargan that Iran would pursue good
neighbourly relations with the Arab states
and would cut all ties with Israel. Therefore,
the Arab states hoped that Iran will return to
Arab sovereignty the three disputed island.
On the contrary, the Arab states soon real-
ized that the Iranian revolution would be-
come embryo of Islamic movements which
could threaten their governments. And this
fear was increased when Shi’a adherents
rebel against the government in Saudi
Arabia, Kuwait, and Bahrain during 1979-
1980.38 For Iranian new regime, this condi-
tion can be understood. This is because
Ayatollah Khomeini saw himself not only as
the supreme leader of Iranian state, but also
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acting on behalf of the entire Islamic commu-
nity.39 Nevertheless, some the Arab states
continued to use the fear of the Iranian
Revolution to justify hostile policies toward
Iran. Hence, it was predicted before, that in
the Iraq-Iran War, many of Arab states fully
support to Iraq invasion. They hoped that
Iraq invasion would fall over the revolution-
ary regime in Iran and then eliminate the
desire to export the revolution to Arab
countries.40
Ironically, the full support and encourage-
ment from the USA, Soviet Union, and the
Arab states for Iraq during the war with Iran,
does not result the winning of Iraq. Many of
them expected that Iraq would win a fast
military victory, because Iran was in trouble
by violent internal political conflict and
economic problem. Otherwise, the Iran
victories over Iraq began in the Fall of 1981
and in April-May 1982 completely conquered
and demoralized the Iraqi forces. After that,
when the Israelis brutally attacked Lebanon
in June 6, 1982 for the main goal to destroy
the PLO (Palestinian Liberation Organiza-
tion) once and for all, Iran was the sole
country which give concrete support for
Palestinians.41 Then, the Iran victories over
Iraq and its moves to assist the Palestinians,
gave Iran sharply increased respect and
credibility in the Arab world. As a conse-
quence, the Iranian model became a serious
challenge to the traditional, authoritarian,
and absolute regimes in the Arab states.
Finally, the Arab states such as Saudi Arabia,
Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Jordan, the United
Arab Emirates, Oman, Egypt, Tunisia and
Morocco has to consider policies and pro-
gram which could respond and eliminate the
threat of the Iranian Revolution.42 From the
above explanations, it clearly argued that the
export of the Islamic Revolution in Iran
became a major threat for many govern-
ments in the Arab States. The threat was
especially for regimes which ruled their
government with corrupt, repressive policies,
and do not give a greater freedom of social
and political expression.
CONCLUSION
This essay discusses the phenomenon of
Islamic Revolution in Iran which has
emerged at 1979 and its impact on many
countries in the world. The Islamic Revolu-
tion in Iran occurred because the Shah Iran
governed Iranian with the authoritarian style
and corrupt behaviour. Another factor which
influenced the revolution is the American
intervention toward Iran which threatened
the existence of religious leaders and tradi-
tional institutions in Iran. As explained
above, the Islamic Revolution in Iran became
as major threat because of the US and its
allies, Soviet Union, and the Arab states felt
threatened with the export of Islamic Revolu-
tion to many countries. In this respect,
Ayatullah Ruhullah Khomeini as the spiritual
guidance of Iranian new regime has stated
that the export of Islamic Revolution is major
goal of their foreign policy and it more
important than economic and political
stability in internal Iran. If the Western
countries and Arab states do not do anything
to prevent this agenda, the revolution will
challenge the Western interests in Middle
East in terms of oil and natural gas supplies.
The export of Islamic Revolution would
endanger the conservative and corrupt
governments in Gulf states which do not give
freedom of expression and prosperity for
their people. As a consequence, they build
alliances to prevent the growth of Iranian
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power such as supporting Iraq during the
Iran-Iraq War in 1980s. The above arguments
suggest that Islamic Revolution in Iran
threatens the US and its allies, Russia, and
the Arab states based on similar reasons but
different contexts.
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